"And I have found both freedom and safety in my madness, the freedom of loneliness and the safety from being understood, for those who understand us enslave something in us. But let me not be too proud of my safety. Even a Thief in a jail is safe from another thief. "

Khalil Gibran (How I Became a Madman)

Lübnan Marunîleri / Yasin Atlıoğlu

NEWS AND ARTICLES / HABERLER VE MAKALELER

Thursday, February 14, 2019

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and al-Qaeda: Affiliates or Foes? (Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi- Fanack)

Much debate about the Syrian insurgent group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the West revolves around the nature of its relations with al-Qaeda (AQ). Conventionally, HTS is classed as an AQ affiliate, based on the fact that HTS’ core constituents evolved out of Jabhat al-Nusra, which was AQ’s official affiliate in Syria. Critics, however, point to extensive disagreements between HTS and AQ that have emerged on social media. The question then arises as to the nature of these disagreements and why, despite them, the classification of HTS as an AQ affiliate remains.
The driving force behind the formation of HTS was the long-standing ideal of ‘unity’ among the Syrian insurgency: something perceived as all the more necessary in light of the serious losses the insurgency has suffered, as the Syrian government has asserted control over all the country’s main cities. In the language of HTS’ leaders, striving for unity through a single entity by breaking ties with AQ was in the ‘interests of the jihad’.
In practice, this supposed ‘unity’ has not meant the merging of all the factions in the field, but rather one group (i.e. HTS) asserting dominance with a single military force embodied in its own fighters alongside a single governing system (in this case, the HTS-backed ‘Salvation Government’). Even so, HTS leaders argue that since Ayman al-Zawahiri himself once said that unity of the ‘mujahideen’ should come above organizational ties, there was nothing illegitimate about the formation of HTS and its break from AQ.
Conversely, AQ supporters assert that HTS’ leaders disobeyed Zawahiri and undertook steps without appropriate consultation. For example, prior to the formation of HTS in January 2017, Jabhat al-Nusra had rebranded itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in July 2016, which was presented to the media as some kind of breaks with AQ. To Zawahiri, however, it was presented as a shift from a public to secret allegiance to AQ. Zawahiri rejected this move. Sami al-Oraidi, a Jordanian and former high-ranking official in Jabhat al-Nusra, claims that after Zawahiri indicated his rejection of the rebranding, Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani (then leader of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and now leader of HTS) pledged not to take any steps to break ties without consulting Zawahiri and obtaining his consent.
Alongside the dispute over whether the formation of HTS was legitimate is a disagreement over strategy on the ground. For example, in Zawahiri’s view, the jihad in Syria should not focus at pre-sent on controlling and administering territory but rather guerrilla warfare in order to bleed the enemy over the long term. In this regard, AQ supporters reject the Salvation Government linked to HTS.